Sample artifact

What an Execution Attestation Certificate looks like.

Every PoE-valid execution issues an EAC. Below is one, rendered for the worked example in Proof of Execution(Rhodes & Kang, 2026), §3: a two-step agent task that extracts Apple’s ticker and retrieves its two-week price performance. The certificate binds the contract, the sealed trace root, the replay context hash, and the signing key id into a single Ed25519-signed artifact. Independently verifiable.

Sample — not a real customer execution

ALPHABITCORE

AI Control Plane · Provable by Design

Execution Attestation Certificate

EAC · v1.2

EAC-2b48aa60a4d8c9f1-20260424-152448

1. Execution Identity

EAC SerialEAC-2b48aa60a4d8c9f1-20260424-152448

Certificate VersionEAC v1.2 · PoE-Core + Gas-Extension

Issued At2026-04-24T15:24:48.903Z

Issuing AuthorityGateway Signing Root (K_gw)

Issuer Key IDgw-prod-2026-q2

ValidityNon-expiring attestation of a bounded execution

2. Contract Binding · id(C) = H(C)

Contract ID2b48aa60…a37e6f57

TaskExtract AAPL ticker and retrieve 2-week performance

Principaluser_292706281397268480

Tenant1001

Activated2026-04-24T15:24:06.134Z

Expires2026-04-24T15:39:06.134Z (not reached)

Policy Snapshot7a3f8c9d…fe41

Planner Versionplanner-v4.7.2

Modelsgpt-4o · claude-sonnet-4-5

Capability Funnelrequested 4 → authorized 13 → used 2

3. Compliance Attestation · PoE Validity Predicate

✓

I₁

Zero-trust start. Unique root allow bound to H(C).

✓

I₂

Gateway scope. Each effect authorized in-scope.

✓

I₃

Null effect on deny. No deny branches present.

✓

I₄

Immutability. Hash chain + seal root verified.

✓

I_5a

Envelope closure. Replay context binds all declared inputs.

Operational Constraints · Cost Attestation

✓

O₁ Budget Closure

Σ per-event cost ≤ contract total budget across all 7 dimensions.

✓

O₂ Cost Monotonicity

Cumulative cost field non-decreasing; matches replay recompute.

4. Causal Event Chain · ECES (5 events)

#	Event ID	Type	UTC Timestamp	Effect	Capability	Cost (this event)
1	evt_4e8222	TASK_CREATED (root)	15:24:06.134	none	—	—
2	evt_011	EB_COMPLETE	15:24:13.421	none	planner.compile	6,777 tk · 7.3s
3	evt_gw_a4f2	GATEWAY_DECISION (allow)	15:24:28.058	none	web.fetch.market_price	—
4	evt_006	CAPABILITY_RESULT	15:24:38.567	external	web.fetch.market_price	$0.002 · 1 call · 10.1s
5	evt_012	TASK_COMPLETED	15:24:48.912	none	analysis.pct_change	994 tk · 1.2s

Hash-link verified on all 5 events. Trace sealing root committed at 4f8c2a9b…d719.

5. Cost Ledger · Signed Execution Bill

Total (USD Equivalent)

$0.0213

Tokens + API + Compute (imputed)

Budget Utilization

38.9%

Max dimension: LLM tokens

Compliance Cost

$0.0004

Attestation overhead (1.9% of exec)

Dimension	Consumed	Budget	Utilization	Chargeable To
LLM input tokens	7,064	15,000	47.1%	tenant:1001 / cc:research
LLM output tokens	707	5,000	14.1%	tenant:1001 / cc:research
Tool invocations	1	5	20.0%	tenant:1001 / cc:research
External API (USD)	$0.0020	$0.1000	2.0%	tenant:1001 / vendor:datafeed
Compute time	41.1s	60.0s	68.5%	tenant:1001 / cc:platform
Storage (bytes sealed)	14,092	100,000	14.1%	tenant:1001 / cc:compliance
Risk units	6	100	6.0%	tenant:1001 / cc:risk

Cost attestation hash 8d3fa74e…2c91 co-verifies three independent sources: LLM provider usage receipt, data-feed invoice, and internal meter trace.

6. Terminal Output · Bounded Response

“The two-week performance for AAPL is approximately +4.97%, computed from closing prices of $273.43 on 2026-04-23 and $260.49 on 2026-04-09.”

Output reproduced on independent replay — bitwise match of terminal state.

7. Cryptographic Proofs

Contract ID · H(C)

2b48aa60a4d8c9f13e7b2f8d6c5a9e4138229a7d91cbf48e2f3b95d10ca37e6f57

Trace Merkle Root · root(T)

4f8c2a9b8e1d7053f62a4e8b9c5d7f13a8e2b4c9d617f8e3a2b7c4d91e5f8a0d719

Replay Context Hash · H(R)

e2d78c3f5a9b6d142f8e7c1b0a4d9e8f5c3b7a2e6d1f8c4b9a3e7d2f16b5a8e6b41

Cost Attestation · H(cost proof)

8d3fa74e1b9c8d2e7f4a6b3c5d9e1f8a7b4c2d6e3f5a9b8c1d7e4f2a6b3c9d2c91

External Anchoring

RFC 3161 TSA · DigiStamp #DS-2026-04-24-0040217
rfc6962:ctl-alphabit · leaf 847,291

8. How to Independently Verify This Certificate

Fetch contract · GET /poe/contracts/2b48aa60a4d8c9f1
Fetch sealed trace · GET /poe/traces/2b48aa60a4d8c9f1
Fetch replay context · GET /poe/replay/2b48aa60a4d8c9f1
Fetch Gateway public key · GET /poe/gateway-keys/gw-prod-2026-q2
Verify Ed25519 signature over this certificate payload · abc-verify eac <SERIAL>
Re-run ValidatePoE(C, T, R) — must return valid · invariants I₁–I_5a and constraints O₁–O₂
Optionally re-run Replay(C, T, R) — terminal output must match §6 bitwise
Confirm Merkle root inclusion at the external anchor (see §7)

This Execution Attestation Certificate is cryptographically sealed. Any modification to its payload invalidates the attached Ed25519 signature and breaks the Merkle inclusion at the external anchor. This certificate does not assert the wisdom of the authorized contract C, nor the safety of the authorized capabilities; it asserts only that the execution stayed within C under the PoE validity predicate and within the stated budget. See Rhodes & Kang (2026), §10 Limitations.

ALPHABITCORE · EAC v1.2 · PoE-Core (Rhodes & Kang 2026) + Gas-Extension · Sample

Reading the certificate

Eight sections, three classes of evidence.

Identity & Binding

Sections 1–2

Who ran what, under which contract. Issuer key id, contract hash, principal, tenant, validity window, and the capability funnel (4 requested → 13 authorized → 2 used) that illustrates scope narrowing.

Compliance evidence

Sections 3–6

Five safety invariants (I₁–I_5a) plus two operational constraints (O₁: Budget Closure, O₂: Cost Monotonicity), all passed. The causal event chain, the signed cost ledger across seven dimensions, and the bitwise-reproducible terminal output.

Cryptographic proof

Sections 7–8

Contract hash, trace Merkle root, replay-context hash, cost attestation hash, external anchoring (RFC 3161 TSA + RFC 6962 CT log), Ed25519 signature over the canonicalized payload. Section 8 is the verification recipe anyone can run.

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